A recent Ohio Supreme Court Decision has fundamentally changed how landlords face liability for dog bites which occur on their property. In Ohio, a dog bite victim has two potential claims to pursue, a common law negligence claim and/ or a claim under Ohio Vicious Dog Statute, R.C. 955.28(B). To prove a claim under the Vicious Dog Statute a Plaintiff must show the Defendant (1) owned, or harbored the dog, (2) the dog’s actions were the proximate cause of the injury, and (3) damages or injuries. To establish a negligence claim, a Plaintiff must establish all the elements of a claim under R.C. 955.28(B) along with the elements of negligence, those being duty, breach, proximate cause, and damages. For purposes of this article, the focus will be on a claim under R.C. 955.28(B). More specifically, this article will address the recent Ohio Supreme Court decision in L.H. v. Sun Secured Financing, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2219 and how that impacts whether a landlord may be liable when a dog injures a person on their property.
I. General Overview
On June 17, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court entered a decision on the case, L.H. v. Sun Secured Financing, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2219. The Case addressed the potential liability exposure for a property owner when a dog, who is permitted on the property, bites and injures a person. More specifically, the case focuses on when a landlord is considered a “harborer,” under Ohio Revised Code Section 955.28(B).
When a person or party is determined to be a “harborer,” under Revised Code Section 955.28(B), a court will impose strict liability against that individual or party for “any injury, death, or loss to person or property” caused by the dog. Meaning, the Court will impose liability against the harborer for the dog bite without requiring any proof of negligence or a culpable mental state.
In L.H., the Court found that to prove the property owner is a “harborer” the Plaintiff must show the property owner “sheltered, protected, or exercised control over the dog.” Merely allowing a dog onto the common area property does not transform the property owner into a harborer. Therefore, the Landlord is not strictly liable for the damage or injuries caused by the dog. This case altered decades of analysis on this issue and has implications for landlords, condominium associations, and homeowners’ associations across the state.
II. Factual Summary
This case stems from a dog bite on October 6, 2020. On the day in question, L.H., a minor, was playing on a playground within a manufactured-home community, otherwise known as a mobile home park, named Oakwood Village. The community is located in Miami Township, Montgomery County, Ohio. Defendant Sun Secured Financing, L.L.C. (Sun) owned the community and was the landlord.
Also on October 6, 2020, Beth Ann Lake’s son and her dog were at the same playground as L.H.. The dog was tied to the swing set on the playground. L.H. approached the dog and was bitten on the face. The bite resulted in over 50 stiches. L.H.’s mother sued Sun Secured Financing and Beth Ann Lake. The Complaint alleges Sun acted as a “harborer,” and thereby is strictly liable for the injuries caused by the Lake family’s dog. The Plaintiff alleged that Sun acted as a “harborer” when it permitted the dog onto the community property which was for the use by all tenants.
III. Procedural History
At the Trial Court level, Beth Ann Lake failed to file an answer to the Complaint. Therefore, the Court entered a default judgment against her. Sun filed a motion to for summary judgment stating they could not be considered “harborers” of the dog at issue because they did not take any actions to shelter, protect, or control the dog at issue.
The Trial Court granted Sun’s summary judgment motion. The Plaintiff appealed the case to the Second District Court of Appeals. The Second District reversed the Trial Court’s decision and stated that Sun had “harborer,” the dog on the playground and was therefore strictly liable for the injuries. Sun appealed the Second District’s decision to the Ohio Supreme Court on two propositions of law: (1) The Second District improperly interpreted the term “harborer,” and (2) the Second District’s decision is inconsistent with the Vicious Dog Statute.
IV. What is a “Harborer”
In L.H., it was clear that Sun was not the owner of the dog at issue. To succeed on their claims, Plaintiff had to establish that Sun acted as a “harborer” of the dog. Prior to L.H.,Courts across Ohio utilized an analysis which focused on whether the landlord gave implied consent to allow the dog to remain on their property. When determining whether a person was a “harborer” under the Vicious Dog Statute, a court would focus on the parties control over the premises where the dog lives or where they have access.
In Sengel v. Maddox, 16 Ohio Supp. 137 (C.P. 1945), the Court held “a person who is in possession and control of the premises where the dog lives, and silently acquiesces in the dog being kept there by the owner, can be held liable as a ‘harborer’ of the dog.” Id., at paragraph two of the syllabus. Courts across Ohio had referenced Sengel to determine whether a party is a “harborer” or not. Ward v. Humble, 2022-Ohio-3258, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.), citing Vallejo v. Haynes, 2018-Ohio-4623, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.) Most likely, if the Court followed the reasoning from these cases, the property owner in L.H. would be considered a harborer and liable for the child’s injuries.
L.H. turned this analysis, and the decades of caselaw addressing this issue, on its head. The Court looked at cases from states like Washington, Illinois, Idaho, and Connecticut where the Courts look to the plain meaning of the term “harbor,” in the context of similar dog-bite statutes. L.H. also looks to the common understanding of the term “harboring.”
L.H. references the definition of harbor from Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990.) To “harbor” is to “afford lodging to, to shelter, or to give a refuge to.” These terms indicate active conduct, not passive acts. To be considered a harborer, a landlord must actively provide shelter, protect, or exercise control over a dog. If a landlord does not do any of these acts, they cannot be considered a “harborer,” and therefore cannot be strictly liable for the damages or injuries caused by the dog. By applying this definition to the facts of the case, the Ohio Supreme Court found that Sun did not provide any shelter or protection for the dog, nor did it exercise control over the dog. Therefore, Sun was not a “harborer,” and could not be found liable for the injuries caused by the dog.
V. How Landlords can Protect Themselves After L.H.
The association in L.H. took steps to shield itself from liability prior to the child being bitten. First, it promulgated rules which clearly stated that while some breeds of dogs were permitted in the common areas, like the playground, it is the owner’s requirement to exercise control over them. The rules provide that dogs must be leashed at all times and the owners must clean up after their dog. The association also provided a breed-restriction list, which outlined which breeds of dogs were not permitted to enter the common areas. These rules explicitly outlined to the dog owners that the association would not provide shelter, protection, or control over their dogs. Most likely, holding in L.H. would apply to any other landlord like a condominium association, or homeowner’s association. Such associations and landlords should look to adopt rules which indicate that the landlord will not provide shelter, protection, or exercise control over a tenant’s pets.
Authors: Brenden Carlin and Anna Ruscak
